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NOTES
INFANT'S DISAFFIRMANCE OF A CONTRACT:
METHODS OF HANDLING THE
RESULTING INJUSTICE
The courts are not in harmony when faced with the issue of
who should suffer the loss when an infant disaffirms his contract.1
The problem seems to be, on the one hand, to protect the infant
from the improvidence incident to his youth and Inexperience, and
how, on the other hand, justice can be maintained. One can more
aptly visualize the problem by an illustration of its application.
In Snodderly v Brotherton,2 a minor purchased a new auto-
mobile from the defendant. A conditional sales contract was signed,
and as part payment, the minor traded in a truck. The defendant
proceeded to overhaul the truck. Two and one-half months later,
the minor disaffirmed the contract after having driven the car
twenty-one hundred miles and depreciating its value. He sought
recovery of the overhauled truck plus damages for loss of its use.
The Washington Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts decision,
balanced the cost of overhauling the truck against the damages
claimed by loss of use, and allowed the minor recovery only for
the truck, on his returning the auto.
Obviously, the minor received the benefit of a new car for two
and one-half months plus the return of the overhauled truck; whereas
the defendant lost time, labor, and expenses m overhauling the
truck, and acquired back his car in a depreciated condition.
Query; does one side always have to suffer a loss? Is it possible
to protect the minor from the adult, the world, and himself, yet
protect the adult from the dishonest mior'
This note will deal with the various methods used by courts in
handling this situation. Not within the scope of this note is the
1. Stanhope v. Shambow, 54 Mont. 360, 170 Pac. 752 (1918) (legislation) , Rodriguez
v. No. Auto Auction, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 395, 225 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1962) (seller entitled to re-
coup loss sustained) Standard Motor Co. v. Stillians, 1 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(minor not liable for depreciation).
2. 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
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problem of the minor's misrepresentation of age, so as to obtain
contractual advantage.8
Society has always felt a moral obligation to protect large classes
of its members who are unable to protect themselves. The need
to protect infants from their lack of experience in contractual matters
was recognized at common law.' Thus, the general rule was that
a contract made by an infant was voidable at his option.5 Those
contracts which were prejudicial to the infant were void; others
which were possibly beneficial were merely voidable. 6 Those of
definite benefit, such as contracts for necessaries and those of
service, were valid and binding upon the infant.7
Although an infant could disaffirm his contract, thereby relieving
himself of all future responsibility, early English law prohibited
a recovery of sums paid under the contract.8 To quote from Lord
Mansfield: "If an infant pays money with his own hand, without a
valuable consideration for it, he cannot get it back again."9
Later cases qualify this statement by deciding the question of
a recovery on whether or not the infant had derived a benefit from
the contract. 10 Where the infant does not enjoy the benefit of the
purchase he can recover the purchase money on restoring the thing
purchased; if he has enjoyed the benefit of the purchase, or had
the use of the thing purchased, the money cannot be recovered.
Steinberg v Scala" extended the "benefit" rule to include any
detriment. In that case the infant applied for shares in the defendant
company, paying the amount due on application. No dividend was
paid on the shares, which were only half paid up when the infant
repudiated the contract. The court held that since, at one time,
the shares had a marketable value the plaintiff could not recover
the money paid by clainng a failure of consideration. In the words
3. Some jurisdictions allow an action against the minor in deceit on the theory that
infants are liable for their torts, while other jurisdictions permit an estoppel on the infant
to plead his non-age. See generally 41 Ind. L. J. 140 n. 16 (1965) 20 I0WA L. REV. 785
(1935).
Statutes have been enacted by various jurisdictions which prohibit disaffirmance by the
misrepresenting minor, IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.3 (1950), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1023
(1964) UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-23 (1953) , REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN. § 26-28-040 (1961).
4. 2 W iLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 223 (3rd ed. 1959).
5. Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Aid. 147, 106 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1821) Cork & Bandon
Ry. v. Cazenove, 10 Q.B. 935, 116 Eng. Rep. 355 (1847) No. Wes. Ry. v. MMichael, 5
Ex. 114, 155 Eng. Rep. 49 (1850).
6. See, CEIESIRnE AND FiFooT, LAW OF CONTRACTS 347 (6th ed. 1964).
7. Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, 97 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1765), Nash v. Inman, 2 K-B.
1, (1908) Roberts v. Gray, 1 KB. 520.
8. Buckingham v. Drury, 2 Eden 60, 28 Eng. Rep. 818, (1762), Holmes v. Blogg, 8
Taunt. 508, 129 Eng. Rep. 481 (1818), See generally 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 240 (Gould's
ed. 1896).
9. Buckingham v. Drury, supra note 8, 2 Eden at 72, 28 Eng. Rep. at 823.
10. Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252, 131 Eng. Rep. 901 (1833) Hamilton v. Vaughan-
Sherrin Engr Co., 3 Ch. 589 (1894).
11. [1923] All E. R. 239.
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of the court, "the question is not, Has the infant derived any real
advantage? but the question is, Has the consideration wholly
failed?"12
In 1874, by an act of the English Parliament, 1 all contracts
entered into by infants for goods supplied (other than contracts
for necessaries) were to be declared absolutely void. But both be-
fore1" and after 1 5 the enactment of the law, infants have been
held liable for contracts of service if such were for their benefit.
Infants are also held liable on their contracts for necessaries on
the theory that they are beneficial to them.0
Ordinarily, if the contract for a non-necessary is void by law,
the infant should be able to recover the consideration running from
him. But such is not the case. Reasoning that the demands of
natural justice apply, it is said that the infant cannot recover unless
there has been a total failure of consideration. 17
It follows that the rationale in treatment of executed contracts
for non-necessaries as opposed to those for necessaries follows a
very fine line, the benefit received being the determinate factor
of the infant's liability in both cases.18 Under this reasoning, it
is hard to contemplate a situation in which the infant is permitted
to use the defense of infancy to his advantage, other than to
eliminate future contractual liability on contracts for non-necessaries.
Apparently little consideration is given to the disparity m experience
between the infant and the adult.
The majority of American jurisdictions regard the returning of
property received a prerequisite to a recovery 19 The right to dis-
affirm is absolute, 20 and "the seller must take the returned property
in the condition in which he finds it."' 2 1 It has been said that "equity
will treat the infant as a trustee for the other party and require
12. Id. C1923] All E.R. at 244 Comment, 72 U OF PA. L. REV. 195 (1924) American
jurisdiction in accord, Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atil. 664 (1887).
13. INFANT'S RELIEF ACT, 37 & 38 Vic. c. 62, § 1.
14. King v. Great Wigston (Inhabitants). 3 B. & C. 483, 107 Eng. Rep. 813 (1824)
where the court said, "It is a general rule of law that an infant cannot do any act to
bind himself unless it be manifestly for his benefit."
15. Fellows v. Wood, 59 L.T. 513, (1888).
16. See cases supra note 7.
17. Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q.B. Div. 166, (1889) Pearce v. Brain, 2 K.B. 310, 98
L.J.K.B . 559 (1929) , Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin, 3 All E.R. 764, (Ct of App., Eng. 1965)(where the question of whether the contract is benefical must be determined as of the date
the contrcat is made).
18. See cases supra notes 7 (necessaries) and 17 (non-necessaries).
19. Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201 (1866) , Merritt v. Jowers, 184 Ga. 762, 193 S.E.
238 (1937) Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398, 89 N.E. 796 (1909) , Gray v.
Grimm, 157 Ky. 603, 163 S.W. 762 (Ct. App. 1914), Adams v. Barcomb, 216 A.2d 648
(Vt. 1966).
20. Carpenter v. McGuckian, 43 RI.L 94, 110 AtI. 402 (1920) Rotondo v. Kay Jewelry
Co., 84 RI. 292, 123 A.2d 404 (1956) where the court said, at 405, "Nothing in the nature
of a condition precedent can be interposed to defeat the right of an infant to disaffirm
his contracts for non-necessaries and to recover the consideration that moved from him."
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
restoration, on the ground that the infant is in possession of property,
which, in good conscience, he will not be permitted to retain when
he has elected to disaffirm."22
Conflict exists as to whether or not the consideration received
must first be returned in order to effectuate the rescission. 28 Indiana
courts have consistently held that the infant need not tender back
the consideration before suing for the value or possession of the
money or property given by him to the adult,2 4 implying that a
countersuit in replevin may be necessary in certain situations.2 5
Where the infant has lost, squandered, or otherwise disposed
of the consideration which he received, he may nevertheless, by
the majority rule, disaffirm his contract and recover the considera-
tion running from him.2 6 One reason underlying this rationale is
taken from Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N Y v Schlavone:2 7
Even if the carrying charges to the company had been
shown here, to allow them would be to hold that an infant
is liable not only for necessaries, but for the cost price
of purchases not necessary, so that an adult could know-
ingly sell anything to an infant, secure in the doctrine that
if he fails to gain a profit, at least he cannot lose.2 8
The Georgia court, in White v Sikes,- intimates mere difficulty
in assessing the value of the consideration received as a reason
for the majority position. To quote:
It may be that the education thus received would be
of value to him, but it is not a thing of value, within the
ordinary meaning of that term, and the law does not require
him to estimate its value and tender the amount of the
estimate thus made.80
Most jurisdictions holding the majority viewpoint, however,
believe that it is the same lack of foresight which induced the
21. Rutherford v. Hughes, 228 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950').
22. Hurwitz v. Barr, 193 A.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
23. Compare Carpenter v. McGuckian, supra note 20, with Sassenrath v. Lewis Motor
Co., 246 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). See Mosko v. Forsythe, 102 Col. 115, 76 P.2d
1106 (1938) Ross P Curtice Co. V. Rent, 89 Neb. 496, 131 N.W 944 (1911).
24. Bowling V. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962).
25. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142 (1873).
26. Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 300 Mass. 281, 15 N.E.2d
467 (1938) (flying lessons) Downey v. Northern Pac. Ry., 72 Mont. 166, 232 Pac. 531(1924) (a cause of action) Rotondo v. Kay Jewelry Co., supra note 20, (diamond ring
given to fiancee) Turney v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 127 Tenn. 673, 156 S.W 1085 (1913)(check turned over to mother) Dawson v. Fox, 64 A.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (scooter
stolen from Infant).
27. 71 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
28. Id. at 982.
29. 129 Ga. 508, 59 S.E. 228 (1907).
30. Id. 59 S.E. at 230.
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infant to make the contract that leads to the dissipation of the
proceeds. To require him to return the consideration before dis-
affirming the contract would deprive him "of the very defense
which the law intended that he should have against the results of
his indiscretion." 81
Unlike English cases, no distinction is made between executory
or executed contracts.82
The question arises as to the manner of coping with the situ-
ations in which the infant receives an obvious benefit from the
contract he later disaffirms. In Shutter v Fudge,8 the Connecticut
Supreme Court faced this very problem. A seventeen year old pur-
chased merchandise from the plaintiff, paying part of the total
price. He used the merchandise to assemble radio sets for re-sale,
thereby gaining a profit on each sale. The court held that the infant
could disaffirm the contract and recover the consideration paid,
without making restitution for the disposed merchandise or for the
profits received.
Boyton v Wedgewood " presented the issue as to whether the
plaintiff, upon such disaffirmance by him, could recover the full
amount paid, while a minor, if any or all of it was received by
him from others as rental for their use of the property Holding for
the plaintiff, the court said:
Had the plaintiff paid for the property out of his own
funds received from sources not related to the property, he
would have been entitled to recover the full sum thereof
without credit to the defendant in the amounts which the
plaintiff may have benefited in receipts from the use or
renting out of the property The fact that payment was
made out of such receipts themselves rather than out of
funds derived by the plaintiff from other sources presents
a distinction without a difference insofar as applicable rules
of law are concerned. 5
Likewise, the infant cannot be held liable for the depreciation and
use of the article 6 or for the seller's loss,87 because "the right
to recover the value of such use, if it exists, rests on contract,
express or implied, and a plea of infancy would bar a suit thereon."38
81. Carpenter v. MeGuckian, supra note 20 at 403.
32. Woolridge v. Hill, 124 Ind. App. 11, 114 N.E.2d 646 (1953) Wuller v. Chuse
Grocery Co., supra note 19.
33. 108 Conn. 528, 143 Atl. 896 (1928) Comment, 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 811 (1928).
34. 346 Mich. 393, 78 N.W.2d 134 (1956).
35. Id. 78 N.W.2d at 126.
36. Mast v. Strahan, 225 S.W 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
37. Icovino v. Haymes, 191 Misc. 311, 77 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Mune. Ct. N.Y. 1948) Harvey
v. Hadfield, 13 Utah 258, 372 P.2d 985 (1962).
88. Utterstom v. Kidder, 124 Me. 10, 124 Atl. 725 (1924) accord, Yancey v. Boyce,
28 N.D. 187, 148 N.W 539 (1914).
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But the infant has been held to account "for any tortious use or
disposition of the property after such avoidance and before its
surrender "89
A few courts have broadened the duty to account for the
consideration received, stating that the infant must follow the con-
sideration (including money), offering to return it or its substitute.40
It is best expounded by the Maine court in a famous case:
[W]hy should not the duty to accountability attach to the
substitute or equivalent as firmly as to the original, and
why should not the minor account for it on avoiding the
contract? The same reason that impressed the original
impresses the substitute. In fact, it is the generally
accepted rule a little more widely applied.4 1
The burden is on the infant to show that he no longer has the
consideration in any traceable form.42
An increasing number of jurisdictions apply the minority doc-
trine, requiring of the infant the restoration of the status quo in
the other party as a condition precedent to a recovery 43 This has
been accomplished by allowing the seller the reasonable compensa-
tion for the use and depreciation of the article while in the infant's
hands. In the words of the Oregon court: "We think this rule will
fully and fairly protect the minor against injustice and imposition
and at the same time it will be fair to the businessman who has
dealt with such minor in good faith."- A doctrine contra to this
''can only lead to the corruption of young men's principles and
encourage them in habits of trickery and dishonesty ,,45
In one case, a fifteen year old purchased an air transportation
ticket, receiving one meal on the flight from New York to Los
Angeles. On returning to New York, she repudiated the transaction.
The plaintiff was denied recovery in that she could not return the
consideration.46
Various jurisdictions have merely codified the majority common
law rule of requiring an infant to restore that part of the considera-
39. Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959) Mast v. Straham,
supra note 36, at 791 (dictum).
40. Worman Motor Co. v. Hill, 54 Ariz. 227, 94 P.2d 865 (1939) White v. Sikes, supra
note 29 Whitman v. Allen, 123 Me. 1, 121 Atl. 160 (1923) Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc.,
197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929).
41. Whitman v. Allen, supra note 40, 121 Atl. at 163.
42. Whitman v. Allen, supra note 40.
43. Rice Auto Co. v. Spillman, 51 App. D.C. 378, 280 Fed. 452 (1922) Rice v. Butler,
160 N.Y. 579, 55 N.E. 275 (Ct. App. 1899) Pettit v. Liston, 970 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660
(1920) Cain v. Coleman, 396 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (dictum).
44. Pettit v. Liston, supra note 43, 191 Pac. at 662.
45. Ibid.
46. Vichnes v. Transcontinental & W Air, Inc., 173 N.Y. Misc. 631, 18 N.Y.S.2d 603
(1940).
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tion in his control when he attained majority 47 The Iowa Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to read that an infant, disaffirming a
contract, need not restore the consideration until his majority. 48
Although Montana requires, by statute,'9 that the infant restore
the consideration to the party from whom it was received, on dis-
affirming a contract, one case holds that the infant's inability to
return the consideration cannot defeat the disaffirmance, 50 stating
that the statute does not contain the clause requiring an infant to
pay "its equivalent. ' ' 51
A number of states recognize the need to differentiate between
the infant over eighteen years of age from the one under that
age. Consequently, by legislation, several jurisdictions require the
infant of eighteen years to return the consideration received or pay
its equivalent as a condition to a disaffirmance. 52 Where by the
nature of the consideration it cannot be returned, the infant must
pay its reasonable value. 53 North Dakota, as one of the jurisdictions
with this statute, has not ruled on this precise issue. The California
courts have defined the purpose of this statute as one operating in
equity, permitting the person dealing with an infant to be placed
m status quo,54 yet discouraging adults from contracting with
minors .55
Although the infant can be held liable for the depreciation of
the article,56 he does not have to account for profits made by use
of the article 57 nor does he have to account for the rental value
of the article."
The statute has no application in those situations in which the
infant is under eighteen years.
59
47. IOWA CODE § 599.2 (1962) KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-102 (1961) UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-2-2 (1953), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.030 (1961).
48. Belckler v. Guenther, 121 Iowa 419, 96 N.W 895 (1903).
49. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-107 (1947).
50. Downey v. No. Pac. Ry., 72 Mont. 166, 232 Pac. 531 (1924).
51. Id., 232 Pac. at 537.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1601 (1953) , Cal. Civ. Code § 35 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-103
(1963) , N.D. CFx. CODE § 14-10-11 (1960) OKL. STAT ANN. 294 § 1 (1965) S.D. CODE
§ 43.0105 (1939).
53. Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 Paa. 320 (1909) Clark v. Stiles, 89 Ida. 191,
404 P.2d 339 (1965) (where the infant was denied recovery because he did not offer to
pay for the services).
54. LeBaron v. Berryessa Cattle Co., 78 Cal App. 536, 248 Pac. 779 (1926) , Murdock
v. Fisher Fin. Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 251 Pac. 319 (1926).
55. Fllttner v. Equitable Life Assur, Soc. of the U.S., 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 Pac. 630
(1916).
56. Toon v. Mack Int'l Motor Truck Corp., 87 Cal App. 151, 262 Paa. 51 (1927) (re-
coupment allowed) , Barber v. Gross, 74 S.D. 254, 51 N.W.2d 696 (1952).
57. Lakey v. Caldwell, 72 Ida. 52, 237 P.2d 610 (1951) (dictum).
58. Loomis v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Ida. 74, 396 P.2d 467 (1964).
59. Robertson v. King, 222 Ark. 276, 280 S.W.2d 402 (1955) Quality Motors v. Rays,
216 Ark. 264, 225 S.W.2d 326 (1949), Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal. App. 158, 285 Pac. 720
(1930) (deceased minor's personal representative could disaffirm without restoring con-
sideration) , Rice v. Anderson, 89 Oki. 279, 134 Pac. 1120 (1913).
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In Mner v Harbor Centerland Co., 60 an infant under eighteen
purchased land, but continued to make payment of installments
after becoming eighteen. On disaffirmance of the contract, the court
did not allow the seller recoupment for damages suffered, stating
that the "payment of installments after the minor reached the age
of eighteen did not remake the old contract or make a new one."6 1
Minnesota and New Hampshire have consistently followed the
benefit rule, under which the infant becomes liable in quasi-contract
to the extent that the contract was beneficial to him.6 2 It is regarded
as an extension of the necessaries rule as the same reasoning is
applied to both. It is best illustrated in a leading case promoting
this doctrine:
The right to recover for necessaries is given, because
the infant has derived a benefit therefrom. It is upon no
other ground. If the benefit is the foundation of the right,
why should it be limited to necessaries. . 6
As with the necessaries rule, not all infants are held liable on their
contracts. The test of whether or not the article purchased by
the infant and used by him resulted in a benefit is determined by
the reasonableness of the purchase as compared with the infant's
station in life. 4 Thus, it is recognized that a contract beneficial
to one person may be injurious to another.65
The adult is not permitted to take advantage of the infant,
under this doctrine, as the infant cannot be held liable unless the
contract be "free from any fraud or bad faith and otherwise reason-
able, fair, and a provident contract for the infant.16 The burden
of proof as to the fairness of the contract lies with the one dealing
with the infant. 6
7
Again, similar to the necessaries rule, an infant is not held
liable for the contract price of the article, but for the benefit re-
ceived as is measured by the fair value of the article.68
Johnson v Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. 69 distinguishes
the benefits rule from the English law70 by emphasizing the fact
60. 41 Cal. App. 79, 182 Pac. 345 (1919).
61. Id., 182 Pac. at 346 (decided under the presently effective CAL. Civ. CODE § 35).
62. Braucht v. Graves-May Co., 92 Minn. 116, 99 N.W. 417 (1904) Bartlett v. Bailey,
59 N.H. 408 (1879).
63. Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354 at 359 (1879).
64. Klaus v. Thompson Auto & Buggy Co., 131 Minn. 10, 154 N.W 508 (1915) Wool-
dridge v. La Vole, 79 N.H. 21, 104 Ail. 346 (1918).
65. Stack V. Cavanaugh, 67 N.H. 149, 30 Atl. 350 (1892) (infant derived no benefit
from the contract).
66. Berglund v. Am. Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N.W 191 at 193 (1916).
67. Gislason v. Henry L" Doherty & Co., 194 Minn. 476, 260 N.W 883 (1935).
68. Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965).
69. 56 Minn. 365, 57 N.W. 934, 59 N.W. 992 (1894).
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that, in order for the benefits rule to apply, the contract must be
fair and free from fraud. In that case, a seventeen year old took
out a life insurance policy from the defendant insurance company
He made a number of payments until he reached majority at which
time he disaffirmed the contract and sought to recover all the moneys
paid. Holding for the defendant, the court allowed the plaintiff
recovery of only the present cash surrender value of the policy,
stating that the contract was a fair and provident one for the infant,
the benefits being such that they could not be restored.
On examining the various methods used by courts in handling
this problem, one begins to wonder as to the amount of protection
today's infant requires. Sociologists tell us that adolescence 7 1 should
be regarded as a developmental period,7 2 not merely a transitory
or in-between stage in which the individual goes from childhood
to adulthood.78
Human development involves a constant progression through
successive stages of dependence. One can reasonably assume that
an adult mental level is reached at some time between the age
of sixteen and twenty-five.7 4 In the legal area, this is exemplified
in the passage of statutes by several jurisdictions 75 recognizing
that the infant over eighteen should be made to account for his
contractual actions.
Society's problem is teaching our young citizens to become
mature, responsible adults. "It seems clear that the learning of
responsibility is rooted in the significant interpersonal relation of
a responsible adult with the child and youth."76 Much emphasis
is placed on the school as the place for the clarification of this
experience.
Although the youth of today spend more years in school,7T
thereby delaying their entry into the business world, they are not
70. English courts would grant no relief on the grounds of fraud or undue influence
where they would not grant it to an adult on the same grounds.
71. Adolescence covers the ages from 14 to 21 years and is the term used by
sociologists.
72. FRIEDENBERG, THE VANISHING ADOLESCENT 9 (1959). The author, one of the leading
authorities in this field, gives this frequently quoted definition. "Adolescence is the period
during which a young person learns who he is and what he really feels. It is the time
during which he differentiates himself from his culture, though on the culture's terms."
73. Maier, Adolescenthood, 46 SOCIAL CASEWORK 3 (1965).
74. Cole and Hall, The End of Adolescence, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 629 6th ed.
(1964).
75. See statutes supra note 52.
76. Harris, Work and the Transition to Maturity, STUDIES IN ADOLESCENCE 54 Grinder
ed. (1963).
77. In 1950, 9% of the 20-24 year olds were still in school, whereas in 1963, 16.8%
were still in school. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THM UNITED STATES 108 (86th ed. 1965).
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greatly helped by the school in the area of responsibility develop-
ment.78
[A] study of what happens to the values of American
students of today shows that their college experience barely
touches their standards of behavior, quality of judgment,
sense of social responsibility, perspicacity of understanding,
and guiding beliefs.79
That be the case, it makes sense to instill in the youth desirable
moral attitudes which can be obtained through everyday experiences
outside of the school. The role of the law should not conflict with
or complicate society's goal.
Therefore, in regard to infant's contracts, it is difficult to imagine
why an infant should not be held to account for any benefits received
under the contract. Yet the "benefit" rule has been applied in only
two jurisdictions10 "The probable reason why the doctrine has not
been widely adopted is that if the transaction has really benefited
the infant, he does not, after majority, seek to disaffirm it.","
It is common knowledge that today's youth have a substantial
amount of money to spend and constitute a vital percentage of the
total consumer market.82 The information is scarce, if non-existent,
as to the percentage of infants who disaffirm their purchases. Never-
theless, the potential to disaffirm is always present.
It becomes clear that it is possible to return the adult to a
near status quo position, and yet not take away the infant's protection,
if all infants, both over and under eighteen years, were held
accountable for the benefits they received under their contracts.
Such a rule would seem to supplement society's goal-that of develop-
Ing responsibility in the youth of today
78. FRIEDENBERG, Op cit. supra note 72, at 63.
79. Jacob, Does Higher Education Influence Student Values?, THE ADOLESCENT -
A BOOK OF READINGS 670 (Seidman ed. 1960).
80. Supra note 62.
81. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 592 (1931).
82. It is estimated that 50 billion a year is spent by and for youth, of which the
youth spend 20 billion a year on personal items. The teen-ager today is said to have
$6 a week to spend freely Studies indicate that 1/2 comes from savings on odd jobs, while
the other 1/2 is obtained from an allowance. Shaffer, Youth Market, EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS (1965).
One extensive study found the median weekly income for the 15-18 year old boys
surveyed was $11.50 for girls in this age group, the weekly incomes averaged $6.85.
Consumer Survey, Youth Market, SCHOLASTIC MAGAZINES (1965).
In one survey, 22% of the respondents spent 2 hours shopping per day. 50% of the
teen-agers interviewed spent $4 or more per week on thier hobbles. Samli and Windes-
hausen, Teen-Agers As a Market, U. OF WASH. Bus. REv. (Feb. 1965).
It is believed that advertisers are becoming more conscious of dealing sincerely with
today's youth on the theory that "brand loyalty" Is formed in the early years. Shaffer,
Youth Market, EDrrORIL RESEARCH REPORTS (1965).
